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Radix, Matrix'.
The Third Body in Levinas’s Ethics
Sławomir Masłoń
University of Silesia 
Katowice
As one speaks to stone, like
you,
from the chasm, from 
a home become a 
sister to me, hurled 
towards me, you, 
you that long ago, 
you in the nothingness of a night, 
you in the multi-night en­
countered, you 
multi-you -
Paul Celan1
1 Poems of Paul Celan, trans. Michael Hamburger (London: Anvil Press Po­
etry, 1988), p. 187.
In Emmanuel Levinas’s ethics of ethics, the position of the 
Third is rather ambiguous, which results in the attitude that in­
volves a large dose of suspicion.
As it is generally known, for the author of Totality and Infin­
ity ethics can be thought exclusively as the relationship above or 
beyond the separation between a subjectivity and another subjec-
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tivity, the Other, obliging the former to forfeit his or her egoism in 
responsibility for the Other, in the relation without contact, which 
breaks the wholeness of ipseity, or “mineness,” and opens it up 
to transcendence that goes beyond Being as a system of general 
dependences we encounter in the world or as the world. The very 
principle from which such ethics starts — that I am the Other’s 
servant or hostage — is here the an-archic lack of ground, result­
ing from its being immemorial: the mute call of the Other that, 
for Levinas, appears as the Face, comes from before memory, from 
before any knowledge. But it is also the truth of Being that tran­
scends Being infinitely as metaphysics of the Good. “The locus of 
truth is society,”2 says Levinas, meaning the ethical absolute rela­
tion, and not the impersonal appearance of Being, which places the 
Neuter dimension above the existent, the singular subjectivity. All 
the above leads to the understanding of ethics that begins from 
the relation that is unequal, yet not based on force: the “power” of 
the Other over me is his or her powerlessness; I am uncondition­
ally obliged by the Other because he or she suffers and only I can 
relieve the suffering. I am elected and this makes me unique; it 
is not because of my ipseity that I am singular but because of the 
Other’s call that relieves me of myself as ipseity; I am truly, that is, 
ethically myself when I am neither myself nor for myself, but when 
I am for the Other.
2 Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Pitts­
burgh: Duquesne University Press, 1969), p. 101.
Such thinking starts with radical inequality which has to be 
retained at all costs, if ethics is to stay operational. Yet, in order 
to take place, it has to be granted by transcendence, by the meta­
physical dimension beyond history as politics and economy.
[T]o say that the other can remain absolutely other, that he enters 
only into the relationship of conversation, is to say that history 
itself, an identification of the same, cannot claim to totalize the 
same and the other. The absolutely other, whose alterity is over­
come in the philosophy of immanence on the allegedly common 
plane of history, maintains his transcendence in the midst of his- 
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tory. The same is essentially identification with the diverse, or, his­
tory, or system. It is not I who resists the system, as Kierkegaard 
thought; it is the other.3
3 Ibidem, p. 40.
History, the favourite field of Levinas’s arch-adversary, Hegel, is a 
great leveller of singularity which ethical thought elevates above 
the immanence of Geschichte. Within history all differences are 
correlated into a system that develops itself on the way to its own 
fulfilment, where every difference is only local and to be overcome 
sooner or later. Such a system loses from sight that which is most 
precious for Levinas: radical alterity that cannot be surmounted, 
or the surmounting of which is unethical. For Hegel, history is al­
ways true, right and good, notwithstanding the suffering it inflicts 
on its subjects: the particular, which is contingent, has to be lev­
elled — aufgehoben — for the absolute, which is general and nec­
essary, to triumph. The system justifies by its laws the crushing 
of singularity in the name of the universal. Such thinking is the 
product of reason which works only by generalisations: singularity 
is made by it into a concept (representation) and therefore divested 
of its particularity becoming replaceable.
The same rules operate on the parallel levels of politics and 
economy. My absolutely singular relation with the Other, which 
does not allow any generality to slip in, is forfeited and our 
places become interchangeable: my goodness to the Other, which 
shunned reciprocity, ceases to be unconditional. Within the realm 
of politics I am obliged to the Other only in so far as he is obliged 
to me. What has happened here is of course the aforementioned 
generalisation of the individual, which lays at the foundations of 
liberal societies. The secret perpetrator of such conceptualisation 
is, however, neither I nor the Other but the Third — in order to 
abstract the Other from its absolute singularity I have to compare 
him to the Third and put them on equal footing; only then can I 
become another instance of this same generic term “Man.” Such 
is the origin of the whole sphere of politics, relaying on the rights 
that are created by subsumption of the irreplaceable singularity
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under the Notion: the same rights for everybody understood as the 
replaceable instance of humanity.
This, however, is completely at odds with Levinas’s ethics 
which speaks about unconditional surrender to the Other without 
expectations of reciprocity — I am ethical only insofar as I resign 
my rights completely and become the Other’s hostage. All systems 
that allow any degree of generality, that is, comparability (and 
any system — an aggregate of ordered elements — in order to be 
a system, has to do it) break the basic law of ethics by means of 
introducing the Third. Yet, how can the Good leave the realm of 
utopia and become at least something like the regulative idea, if it 
does not want to “compromise,” if it wants to maintain the abso­
lute separation between the Other and the Third? (Can it be that 
my neighbour is the Second? But such a notion is wrong: the Other 
as incomparable cannot bear any number.) Moreover, is not the 
insistence on absolute ethics and refusal to distinguish between 
different kinds of politics (e.g. democratic and authoritarian) as 
equally totalitarian unethical? Doesn’t it perversely suggest that 
the worse the system the better it is for the practice of ethics, that 
is, infinite sacrifice for the Other?4
4 Matgorzata Kowalska, Dialektykapoza dialektyka (Warszawa: Aletheia, 2000), p. 147.
Levinas tries to assuage this paradox by introducing the Third 
as the Other of the Other. Insofar as he or she is the external 
point of vantage on the relation between the ethical subject and 
the incomparable Other, the Third is the envoy of generality, 
since he or she watches the relation from disengaged perspective 
and sees only the symmetry of related subjects partaking in the 
whole as the system. If, however, we change the perspective and 
treat the Third as the Other of the Other (therefore the potential 
recipient of infinite surrender), he or she will appear as the emis­
sary of thought marked by absolute relation yet not indifferent to 
(political) justice and, therefore, somehow limiting ethics: I cannot 
expect reciprocity from the Other — even if he mistreats me I still 
have the obligation towards him — but what happens to such obli­
gation if the Other makes the Third suffer?
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The poor one, the stranger, presents himself as an equal. His equal­
ity within this essential poverty consists in referring to the third 
party, thus present at the encounter, whom in the midst of his desti­
tution the Other already serves.0
I am unequal as far as the Other, who calls to me from his or her 
heights, is concerned, but, paradoxically, the unconditionality of 
the call is a vehicle of our abyssal equality: since the Third is the 
Other of the Other, I and the Other are equal in our inequality 
to our Others. Yet, these Others are never the same — even if he 
or she becomes the same person our relationships with him or 
her are absolutely singular and incomparable. Such equality is 
strangely unequal, in spite of the fact that it somehow limits the 
unconditional obligation. The “chain” of responsibility, however, 
never closes, it will never become a circle — I cannot expect. I 
cannot even think, that the responsibility I offer will sooner or 
later be given back to me on the basis of “structural necessity:” 
if ethical injunction is the generally binding principle I will also, 
in due time, become a beneficiary of its grace. Thinking thus is 
confusing the plane of law, that is, generality and system, where 
the rule of structural necessity operates, with the plane of eth­
ics, which is always singular, discontinuous and futureless. The 
ethical answer to the call of the Other is simply “here I am” and 
knows nothing of the law.
As we have mentioned earlier, the “place” ethics comes from is 
situated beyond Being. The Good enters history in order to judge it.
If subjectivity cannot be judged in Truth without its apology [in 
apology I affirm myself in responding to the call of the Othe-J, if 
judgement, instead of reducing it to silence, exalts it, then there 
must be a discord between the events and the good, or, more exactly, 
events must have an invisible meaning which only a subjectivity, a 
singular being can determine. To place oneself beyond the judge­
ment of history, under the judgement of truth, is not to suppose be­
hind the apparent history another history called judgement of God 
— but equally failing to recognize the subjectivity. To place oneself *
0 E. Levinas, Totality and Infinity..., p. 213.
4 The Same ...
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under the judgement of God is to exalt the subjectivity, called to 
moral overstepping beyond laws, which is henceforth in truth be­
cause it surpasses the limits of its being.6 7
6 Ibidem, p. 246.
7 II is the masculine personal pronoun in French.
History is an indifferent and immanent system in which apology 
is silenced and what is considered good is only “what is the case,” 
therefore the truth which can judge history and give its due to apol­
ogy can only come from outside history, from transcendence, also 
called by Levinas judgement of God, which rends the fabric of the 
immanent “objective” laws and presents them from the perspective 
of infinity, that is, the Other. Such is the work of the Good.
Yet, as we have noticed, the practice of absolute goodness — un­
conditional surrender to the Other — has already been conditioned 
by quite historical circumstances of the Other not hurting his or 
her Other; and there are more uneasy issues related to the problem 
of historicity, which are raised in some quarters. For instance: is it 
accidental that, in Levinas’s oeuvre, the otherness of the Other is 
rendered by the term “illeity”V Is it possible, while discussing eth­
ics in religious (although not theological) terms, to avoid certain 
gestures that all monotheisms hide? For the sake of brevity we will 
only refer to one example.
Jacques Derrida, in his reading of Levinas entitled “At this very 
moment in this work here I am,” interrogates a certain permanent 
slippage in these texts, taking as his example Levinas’s discussion 
of paternity: why is it that, when he speaks about paternity, the 
child is always a son, and never a daughter? Or why is it always 
paternity for that matter?
For Levinas, the son is a specific example of the Other who is 
and, at the same time, is not me. We would have to come back to 
this untypical relation to question it later on. For the time being 
what interests us is the ubiquitous masculinity of the offspring. 
The line of defence could, of course, be that the Other in its ethi­
cal dimension is not yet sexed, and that “son” or “he” names just 
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a neutral child, sexually unspecific. Yet, why is ethical difference 
sexually indifferent? And is it just neutral to mark as masculine 
something that is there prior to sexual differentiation? If one calls 
the Other “he” while in fact the Other is sexually neutral, one, 
just as well, has to be prepared to call the Other “she.” For Levi­
nas, however, the personal pronoun of the Other is also a name to 
call out to transcendence whose other name is God. Is he then pre­
pared to use the feminine pronoun in such a situation, to address 
God as a woman? One may have grave doubts about it. Moreover, 
if the masculine is treated as tantamount to the neutral, isn’t it 
true that such a gesture makes the feminine secondary? Since 
sexual difference and the feminine are both made into secondary 
characteristics, ultimately femininity gains subordinate status.8 
Derrida writes:
8 Simon Critchley, The Ethics of Deconstruction (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), p. 134.
9 Jacques Derrida, “At this very moment in this work here I am,” in Re-Reading 
Levinas, eds. Robert Bernasconi and Simon Critchley (London: Athlone, 1991), p. 42.
10 Ibidem, p. 43.
Since it is under-signed by the Pro-noun He (before he/she, certain­
ly, but it is not She) could it be that in making sexual alterity sec­
ondary [it] becomes [...] a mastery, the mastery of sexual difference 
posed as the origin of femininity? Hence mastery of femininity?9
Can one honestly claim that history is absent in the relation with the 
Other constructed along such scenario? In the name of neutrality, 
Levinas privileges masculinity and masters the feminine, 
assigning to it the subsidiary status that the (neutral!) Third had 
in our earlier discussion of it. And we should bear in mind that such 
Third was treated as potentially dangerous for ethics precisely 
because of its neutrality. Yet here also, as it already happened, 
the Third may come back with a vengeance: the secondary status 
of the feminine, the fact that it escapes the Other, makes it the 
Other’s Other10, alterity to the second degree, and therefore in 
need of possibly greater respect, or at least the same, if the respect 
of ethics is infinite. (Is there only one infinity? In paternalistic 
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monotheism: surely yes, but what about maternity in this respect? 
We cannot pursue these questions here.)
One may be drawn to ask further questions in that vein, as they 
have been asked by many11, and it is not by accident that the most 
convoluted and unsatisfactory fragments of Totality and Infinity 
concern woman, Eros and fecundity, or that Otherwise Than Being 
shifts its point of interest to maternity while Eros largely drops 
out of discourse. However, leaving the questions concerning the 
feminine to those more passionately concerned with the subject, 
we would rather go back to the child.
11 See especially: Luce Irigaray, “On the Divinity of Love,” in Re-Reading 
Levinas..., pp. 109-118.
12 E. Levinas, Totality and Infinity..., p. 277.
13 Ibidem, p. 282.
In a situation such as paternity the return of the I to the self, which 
is set forth in the monist concept of the identical subject, is found 
to be completely modified. The son is not only my work, like a poem 
or an object, nor is he my property. Neither the categories of power 
nor those of knowledge describe my relation with the child. The 
fecundity of the I is neither a cause nor a domination. I do not have 
my child; I am my child. Paternity is a relation with a stranger who 
while being other (“And you shall say to yourself, ‘who can have 
borne me these? I was bereaved and barren [...]”’ Isaiah, 49) is me, a 
relation of the I with a self which yet is not me. In this “I am” being 
is no longer Eleatic unity. In transcendence the I is not swept away, 
since the son is not me; and yet I am my son. The fecundity of the I is 
its very transcendence. The biological origin of this concept nowise 
neutralizes the paradox of its meaning, and delineates a structure 
that goes beyond the biologically empirical.11 2
Here, for Levinas, the child is another example of irreducible plu­
rality within Being: in paternity the self-identity of the subject is 
broken because in my son I escape myself as a subject of systematic 
laws, e.g. of memory and, with that, of destiny.
Without multiplicity and discontinuity — without fecundity — the I 
would remain a subject in which every adventure would revert into 
the adventure of a fate.13
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With the coming of the child, subjectivity escapes its fate because 
the child, who for Levinas is myself, yet separate, is capable of an­
other fate and with that resumes “the adventure of existence so as 
to be to the infinite.”14 The child is my completely new beginning, 
free from all matters that determined me previously.
14 Ibidem.
15 Ibidem, p. 258.
“The son is not only my work, like a poem or an object, nor is he 
my property [...].” With such “only” Levinas obviously refers to the 
difference between having and being (“I do not have my child; I am 
my child”) and also, as we have noticed, to the discontinuity of my 
being which surfaces in the offspring. Yet the “only” can also be 
understood in the most straightforward way: the child is not only 
my work of paternity, because there is also the mother.
(Parenthetically: can the child be considered a work or even the 
work? He or she is not just myself made other, but my relationship 
with the differently sexed Other — who, by the way, must be a “fully- 
fledged” Other and not “[t]he Beloved, at once graspable but intact in 
her nudity, beyond object and face”15 who abides in darkness and in­
validates expression; we will come back to that — made flesh. Since 
the relation is for Levinas always transcendent, which means infinite 
or unfathomable, we would rather say that the child is the unwork­
ing, that which makes the accomplishment of work impossible.
As far as another example is concerned: is the poem my work 
in the sense that an object I have made may be? Insofar as the lan­
guage I use to create is not mine, it cannot be.)
There is also the mother and with that the tame discontinu­
ity of father/son seems to appear a bit more complicated. What is 
more, our old problems with fitting the Third into the face-to-face 
relation which is said to be original, an-archic and, in a sense, 
isolated, but which also is, as we have seen, always haunted and 
somehow limited by the Third, whom we called the Other of the 
Other, comes back to us even more forcefully.
Why then, if the Third keeps inserting herself into the rela­
tion, is Levinas so adamant to exclude her? One of the answers 
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may be that he privileges the dyad because ethical asymmetry of 
absolute difference, which is said to open the egoistic individual to 
the Other who is transcendent, impossible to grasp, is built on the 
model of prayer. What we have here is the model situation of a man 
totally diminished before God, and all other Levinasian concepts 
describe such a relation ever clearer: infinite patience, the loss of 
initiative, guilt, etc.
Yet, as we have noticed, the repressed and the silently mastered 
keeps haunting such face-to-face with the father.16 Because of that, 
in order not to allow the Third to be permanently turned into the 
spectre, some kind of acknowledgement is necessary. One of the 
possible ways would be this: instead of speaking about discontinu­
ity in the dyadic situation of paternity, we may rather introduce the 
triadic model of family into the discussion of the absolute relation.
16 It is interesting to note in this context that in his early work Existence and 
Existents Levinas speaks about the urgent philosophical necessity of committing 
parricide on Parmenides.
17 Levinas would of course reject that, saying that materialism equals history or 
any other system: “Materialism does not lie in the discovery of the primordial function 
of the sensibility, but in the primacy of the Neuter. To place the neuter dimension of 
Being above the existent which unbeknown to it this Being would determine in some 
way, to make the essential events unbeknown to existents, is to profess materialism.” 
(Totality and Infinity..., pp. 298-299). Yet is dialectical materialism of Marx the only 
possible materialism, as Levinas seems to suggest here?
Such a move would allow us, for instance, to reinterpret the 
crucial places devoted to Eros in Levinas’s oeuvre. First of all, 
in spite of Levinas’s work of abstraction (that is neutralisation, 
so condemned by him), the Other, a singular human being is, 
to put it crudely, a “genital” product. There would be no Other 
without sexual difference, because each possible Other in order 
to be available for the absolute relation has to be born-, only as 
incarnated can he or she be “transcendentalised.” Which would 
mean that messianism, as Levinas understands it (the judgement 
of history by ethics), can only begin as materialism17 — there is 
no transcendence unless there is community, otherwise we revert 
to theology.
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The Other is said to open one to the transcendence which is 
ethics beyond history. In such transcendence the Other is in­
comprehensible and unrepresentable, because all representation 
becomes knowledge that generalises the Other and turns him or 
her into an object. Such transcendence is made possible by the 
Face. But the Face is not a mask — it is always naked; its naked­
ness puts its vulnerability on display. Yet, is what he describes in 
this way only true about the Face? The Other’s whole naked body 
cannot be reappropriated through the representation if we do not 
want to make him or her into a thing; the whole body is unrep­
resentable, imageless, insofar it is the Other and does not belong 
to him or her. The Other’s vulnerability is displayed there in the 
naked body exclusively, appearing as the presence of the other, 
material presence and not as the aggregation of functional parts 
of some whole (an organic mechanism and, therefore, a thing). 
Hence, the cunning of the uniform, as Elias Cannetti noticed: it 
would not be so easy to kill the other, if people had to fight naked. 
(Admittedly, the face is the part of the body that is kept perma­
nently naked, but this makes it only a synekdoche of the body as 
such and not a privileged spot; unless we treat the eyes as “the 
windows of the soul” and collapse into dualism again. But, above 
all, the phenomenal face is not the ethical Face.) Moreover, the 
naked body understood in the aforementioned sense as imageless 
is much more than an enigma (Levinas speaks about the inex­
haustible enigma of the Face). A naked body does not harbour 
any secret, it simply reveals that “there is nothing to reveal, 
everything is there exposed,”18 the body does not hide anything; 
here “endlessly, the mass rises to the surface and peels off as 
surface.”19 Such exposure, such inexhaustible obviousness is pre­
cisely what commands the ethical relation: the “secret” (which is 
a “materialised” one) is on display, yet it eludes comprehension: 
the Other is, and he or she is naked, I must relieve this suffering.
18 Jean-Luc Nancy, “Corpus,” in The Birth to Presence, trans. B. Holmes et al. 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993), p. 205.
19 Ibidem, p. 199.
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There is no enigma here, no unspeakable secret hidden behind the 
surface which would welcome or disallow penetration. Only this 
kind of exposure can accomplish what is one of Levinas’s dreams: 
to finish off the virility of thought.
The Face has also another silent advantage for Levinas: sexual 
difference is present there only secondarily (if at all) and this is 
the place he wants it to keep. Yet, the undivided body is no body 
“in general,” it is never neutral — the body does not have sex, it 
is the sexual difference incarnated and only that makes possible 
Levinas’s paternity (or maternity, for that matter). The body (“ma­
terialism”) seems to be Levinas’s blind spot, and that is probably 
why he has to return permanently to the transcendence beyond 
history which can make judgements on history. Yet, perhaps it 
is possible, taking into consideration all our “perversions” of the 
transcendent relation (the split Other, the child who is emphati­
cally not myself20), to trace the values about which Levinas speaks 
as produced “materially,” that is, historically?
20 In the chapter of Totality and Infinity called “Fecundity,” Levinas puts for­
ward certain propositions which, considered in the light of transcendence, seem to 
us utterly unacceptable, e.g.:
By a total transcendence, the transcendence of trans-substantiation, the I is, in the child, 
an other. Paternity remains a self-identification, but also a distinction within identifica­
tion — a structure unforeseeable in formal logic. p. 267
In fecundity [...] the I is other and young, yet the ipseity that ascribed to it its meaning 
and its orientation in being is not lost in this renouncement of self. Fecundity continues 
history without producing old age. [...] Both my own and non-mine, a possibility of myself 
but also a possibility of the other, of the Beloved, my future does not enter into the logical 
essence of the possible. pp. 267-268
Whether it is paternity or maternity, they are self-identification to no extent what­
soever. The child is not my future and in particular is not a possibility of myself 
— the child is vulnerability of the wholly Other. The child is (partly) “myself” only 
on the most crude biological level; ethically, he or she is the Other — genes have 
nothing to do with it: the adopted child is, from the point of view of ethics, exactly 
in the same place as the biological child, notwithstanding his or her being geneti­
cally “myself” to no extent.
We have to come back to our family triad (which is here, of 
course, only the simplified model of plurality: four, five, six, etc.). 
In a family situation nobody is replaceable and all relations are 
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asymmetric. First of all, the human child is always born “too ear­
ly,” without the sacrifice on the parents’ part it will not live; both 
of them are indispensable if we consider proper development. Fur­
thermore, one parent cannot put his or her responsibility on the 
other parent (although it has been too often done in our paternal­
istic society), because in each case my responsibility for my child 
is always mine and impossible to be exhausted. One also cannot 
say that one has done enough and now is the other parent’s turn. 
When one stops thinking about the child’s well-being one becomes 
egoistic; if one thinks that one has a right to be replaced one be­
comes legalistic (“all should have equal responsibilities”) which is 
another form of ethical egoism.
Nobody can change places in the family relationship. The adults 
obviously cannot take the place of the child, but they also cannot 
“swap” — although they can, for instance, reverse or displace the 
traditional roles (like taking care of home or getting money), they 
will always remain mother and father (sexual difference).
The relationship between the parents has to be asymmetric as 
well. Although Levinas tries to collapse the absolute difference 
between lovers into a relationship outside the face (“The beloved, 
returned to the stage of infancy without responsibility — this co­
quettish head, this youth, this pure life ‘a bit silly’ — has quit her 
status as a person”21) saying that it is “the very contrary of the 
social relation,” because “it remains intimacy, dual solitude, closed 
society,”22 love cannot be thought otherwise than on the basis of 
the absolute relation (in this sense it is secondary), since before 
somebody becomes my lover, he or she has first to become for me 
the Other, the human neighbour whose hostage I become. (Love 
may contradict my relation as hostage, but it will never get the up­
per hand, since it would have to annul itself: egoistic love is a con­
tradiction of terms.) Treating love as communion (the blurring of 
limits irrecoverable to the “formal logic”) repeats the same ethical 
slip that the comment on the child as “myself” has committed: the
21 E. Levinas, Totality and Infinity..., p. 263.
22 Ibidem, pp. 264-265.
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confusion of the ethical and the biological plane.23 Moreover, the 
family is a social relation and as such must be first of all thought 
ethically. For Levinas only one relation is ethical — the absolute 
relation to the Other.
23 Unexpectedly, this is also the direction in which Irigaray, commenting and 
“rectifying” Levinas, goes; e.g.:
F...1 the loss of boundaries which takes place for both lovers when they cross the bound­
ary of the skin into the mucous membranes of the body, leaving the circle which encloses 
my solitude to meet in a shared place, a shared breath, abandoning the relatively dry and 
precise outlines of each body’s solid exterior to enter a fluid universe where the percep­
tion of being two persons becomes indistinct.
“On the Divinity of Love,”... p. Ill
Doesn’t it rather sound like some theorists’ wishful thinking?
The triadic asymmetry does not only operate between the 
members of the family. In order to show that even in a dualistic 
framework the child is nobody’s work, we have already noticed 
that the child is the incarnated relationship between the I and the 
Other. But the situation, in fact, is rather more complicated: the 
child as subjectivity is not the incarnation of the dyadic relation­
ship between the parents, he or she is the incarnation of the triadic 
relation mother—father—child in the state of becoming, also in its 
historical dimension. So, while for Levinas the Other is my abys­
sal truth (truth without substance but truth nevertheless), in the 
family relation the Other is always double, so the truth of it is split. 
And within this split truth — where the father is the truth of the 
mother, the mother is the truth of the father — their truth is not 
the same truth since they cannot, as we mentioned earlier, swap 
places with one another as far as the child is concerned.
In the light of the above, therefore, the child is (the incarnation 
of) the asymmetrical relation with the split Other, so the relation 
with the non-neutral Other(s) marked with both ethical difference 
as well as sexual one is the child’s truth. Yet this truth is — to use 
Levinas’s term — an an-archic truth: it comes from immemorial 
time before consciousness, before subjectivity, since the relation is 
what made such subjectivity possible. The child is “originally” the 
relation with the Other(s), but the relation is no substance, since it
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is every time unique and infinite. Such a relation consists of emp­
tying out of one’s self for the Other in the “sentimental” and “un­
reasonable” compassion which is its rule that lacks any essential 
ground. Yet such a rule does not come from beyond history as an 
instrument to judge history with. It turns out to be the product of 
a micro-history, liable to be perverted by historical circumstances 
(pathological upbringing, ideology, etc.). But this, paradoxically, 
makes it only more urgent and even more unconditional.
Strangely enough, it seems that we finally ended up in a very 
ancient spot. Aren’t we also struggling here with the familiar 
Antigone’s dilemma? For her, the insurmountable wall divided the 
laws of the family (which Hegel, in the Phenomenology of Spirit, 
called the “divine law”) and community (Hegelian “human law”). 
Levinas — the enemy of Hegel — divides precisely the same: “in­
finite transcendence” (judgement of God) and “finite historicism” 
(politics, economy) validating, against Hegel, the former. But do we 
have to choose between Jerusalem and Athens once again? Only 
when we insist on the beyond-history of transcendence. However, 
what happens if, as we have tried to argue, the Face, or rather the 
body, presents itself not as a hidden enigma of the beyond-history 
but as a depthless, yet inexhaustibly infinite materiality of incar­
nated ethics weighing down on us with its obviousness? What if 
messianism, properly understood, is nothing else than what we 
have been pursuing here: materialist transcendence?
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Radix, Matrix: trzecie ciało w etyce Levinasa
Streszczenie
Autor próbuje określić zręby dyskursu zdolnego przezwyciężyć paradoksalną 
neutralizację, której w myśli Levinasa ulega Inny; stara się pokazać, że aby uchro­
nić relację pomiędzy mną a Innym przed generalizacją abstrakcji, musimy przestać 
operować nią w kategoriach Levinasowskiego diadycznego modelu modlitwy, który, 
choćby na poziomie relacji między płciami, prowadzi do pewnych niemożliwych do 
zaakceptowania waloryzacji. Wydaje się, że modelem bardziej owocnym mógłby być 
triadyczny (a właściwie „polimeryczny”) model relacji rodzinnej, w którym Inny 
zyskuje płeć, a zatem zostaje rozszczepiony na dwa równorzędne, lecz nietożsame 
byty, co nie tylko pozwala uniknąć dyskusji poświęconej miejscu początkowo wy­
kluczonego z etyki Trzeciego jako Innego Innego, ale także — ponieważ pokazuje, 
że Levinasowską etyczną transcendencję, jeśli spojrzeć na nią pod pewnym kątem, 
można wyprowadzić z materialności nagiego ludzkiego ciała (którego Twarz jest 
tylko synekdochą) — umożliwia nawiązanie etycznego dialogu z dyskursami histo­
rycznymi i materialistycznymi, które myśl Levinasa wykluczyła z obszaru etyki.
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Radix, Matrix: dritter Körper in der Ethik von Levinas
Zusammenfassung
Im vorliegenden Artikel bemüht sich sein Verfasser, die Grenzen einer Erörterung 
zu beginnen, die die paradoxe Neutralisierung der, nach Levinas, ein Anderer unter­
liegt, zu überwinden könnte. Er will zeigen, dass wir aufhören müssen, in Kategorien 
des dualen Gebetmodells von Levinas zu denken, das auf der Ebene der zwischenge­
schlechtlichen Relationen zu einigen, nicht akzeptablen Aufwertungen führt, wenn wir 
die Relation zwischen mir und dem Anderen vor Abstraktionsgeneralisierung retten 
wollen. Ein viel besseres Modell scheint das triadische (genauer gesagt „polymere“) 
Modell der Familienrelation zu sein, in dem der Andere ein bestimmtes Geschlecht 
bekommt und demnach in zwei gleichberechtigte, aber nicht identische Existenzen 
aufgespaltet wird. Es lässt eine an den Haaren herbeigezogene Diskussion über die 
Rolle des, zunächst aus der Ethik ausgeschlossenen Dritten als eines andersartigen 
Anderen zu vermeiden. Solch ein Modell ermöglicht auch einen ethischen Dialog mit 
den historischen und materialistischen, von Levinas aus der Ethik ausgeschlossenen 
Diskursen, weil es zeigt, dass man die ethische Transzendenz von Levinas, wenn man 
sie unter einem bestimmten Gesichtspunkt betrachtet, aus der Materialität des nack­
ten menschlichen Körpers (dessen Gesicht lediglich eine Synekdoche ist) ableiten kann.
